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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter examines the role of animals in divination in ancient times. It discusses 
ancient observers’ interpretation of signs coming from instinctive animal behaviour and 
from the structure of animal body parts. It explains the three main currents of 
philosophical thought on divination. Plato and Aristotle believed the divinatory insights to 
be tied with animal instinct and belong to a fringe form of cognition that is specifically 
connected with humans’ animal natures. On the other hand, the Stoics considered 
divination as an important piece of their understanding of the cosmos as a whole, and of 
humans as part of it.
Keywords: animals in divination, ancient times, interpretation of signs, animal behaviour, animal body parts, Plato,
Aristotle, Stoics, divinatory insights, form of cognition
Introduction
ACROSS the whole ancient world, people used a broad array of techniques and disciplines 
to make themselves attentive to what they thought to be hidden information buried in the 
events unfolding around them. These practices, classified in Greek as the disciplines of 
mantikē and in Latin as divinatio, were utterly common. They were not, for the most part, 
considered esoteric or occult. The ancients understood that the universe had certain 
inclinations built into it, which were more or less closely tied to the inclinations of the 
gods. Like the weather, these were a part of the ancient atmosphere; and throughout the 
Greek and Roman sources we find people trying to gauge the prevailing winds. They 
perceived messages in a wide variety of signs, but nearly all of the most prominent and 
durable of the Greek and Roman systems make use of animals. Aeschylus’s overview of 
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the classical terrain, put into the mouth of Prometheus, announces where humans might 
look to find these hidden indicators, and he gives animals the balance of attention:
And I marked out the many ways of divination, and among dreams I first discerned 
which are destined to come true; and I explained to them words overheard by 
chance and chance meetings. The flight of crook-taloned birds I distinguished 
carefully—which by nature are auspicious, which sinister—and each has a 
particular mode of life, some are hostile to each other, and they have affections 
and favourable positionings in groups; and the smoothness of their entrails, and 
what colour the gall must have to please the gods, also the speckled symmetry of 
the liver-lobe; and the thigh-bones, wrapped in fat, and by burning the long loin I 
set mortals on the right path in an art that is difficult and murky.
(Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound 484–98)
Given the functionally infinite range of potential vocabulary for the divine 
language, it does not simply stand to reason that animals would emerge as such a 
prominent category. The grounds for this are doubtless manifold. Since prehistory, people 
were accustomed to making life-critical decisions based on the behaviours of animals in 
the food supply, and such attentiveness may have become acculturated in stylized and 
systematized forms. Such a link is already made by Democritus (fifth century BC), who 
explained divination by entrails as an indication of whether fields will be barren or 
productive (DK68 A 138). Other possible reasons for the interest in animals can be 
adduced. It was a part of ancient lore that many animals possessed a certain quickness 
and acuity of perception that made them able to sense things that humans were not yet 
able to (Schol. Aratum 913; Cicero, De divinatione 1.15). Further, the non-discursive 
modes of thought in which divination is understood to engage align with the instinctive 
thought processes of non-human animals, where discursivity is non-existent. Ancient 
observers make such connections explicit (see below). Finally, modes of divination that 
focus on animals would have provided a means to reconcile two large pieces of human 
identity that Greeks and Romans typically separated. They configure the world of non-
human animals, with which humans’ creaturely natures are aligned, to be instrumental 
to, and not antithetical to, the human intellect, which most ancient observers set apart 
from our corporeal, animal qualities and align with the divine. Such a focus on animals as 
a medium to reach the divine accords with a congruent focus in the fundamental religious 
practice of sacrifice, with which divination is often paired.
Most ancient observers classified divination in two main forms: artificial and natural. In 
the first category, messages are observed in significant phenomena in the world outside 
the observer, the meaning of which is determined using empirical methods. The observer 
correlates the present observation with past records, to see whether it bodes well or ill. 
In this variety, divine signs are regularly found in animal behaviours and the structures of 
their bodies or parts. The flight paths of birds, the twitching of entrails, odd actions of 
large mammals, or the feeding behaviours of chickens are all considered significant over 
time. According to the second kind of divination, the inward, natural variety, a human 
(p. 311) 
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being receives a direct inspiration through dreams, visions, or inspired oracular 
pronouncements, via a distinctive kind of cognitive activity. Even in this variety, centred 
as it is on subjective human experience, the theme of animals also surfaces. A rich and 
multivalent tradition of philosophical commentary on divination consistently links it with 
the creaturely side of the human being. Thinkers often draw connections between 
divinatory insight and animal instinct. The prominence of women as oracles (Pythias and 
Sibyls), whom Greek men typically marked as being closer to animal nature, is a 
noteworthy preliminary indication. One school of thought, the Stoics, achieves a grand 
unified theory of divine signs via understanding the cosmos as a whole to be a single 
living animal (zōon).
Instinctive Animal Behaviours as Signs
Birds
Of the animals that are potentially signs in the Classical world, birds take pride of place. 
In an early indication of this, Hesiod sums up the Works and Days, his almanac of how to 
live, with a final sentence that places bird-reading on a paratactic footing with everything 
else he has talked about: ‘A man is happy and lucky who knows all these things and does 
his work without offending the deathless gods, who discerns the omens of birds and 
avoids transgression.’ The Greek term for bird of prey (oiōnos) becomes elided with the 
idea of any kind of divine sign (Euripides, Orestes 788, Thucicides, 6.27, Aristophanes, 
Birds 719) and the verbal form (oiōnizomai) comes to mean ‘to read omens’ generally. 
Already in Homer’s time birds were looked to in the most important of the divination 
systems. Calchas is equally a ‘mantis’ (a ‘seer’) and ‘the most skilled of the bird 
interpreters by far’ (Iliad 1.69–92). That bird divination is often understood to be 
distinctively Greek has contributed to an underdeveloped study of its Near Eastern 
antecedents. But an interest in birds as divine signs is in evidence in Babylonia, Assyria, 
and among the Hittites (West, 1997: 47). An early fifth-century inscription from Ephesus 
expresses rules for bird divination in the distinctive protasis–apodosis style (‘if this, then 
that’) characteristic of thousands of Near Eastern divinatory tablets (SIG 1167). Why the 
ancients found birds important is impossible to say with certainty. It is often remarked by 
scholars, but less often by ancient testimony, that their proximity to the sky put them 
closer to the divine. Their simple capacity to defy gravity would also have been a 
potential source of raw wonder, as well as their aural richness, made even more poignant 
by their appearance and disappearance in conjunction with the seasons. The speed and 
impulsiveness of their actions is also probably a factor.
Birds of prey are especially important. Their eating of meat deepens their association 
with the world of animals, down to the level of the sinews, and this may reflect an 
ongoing importance of corporeal and visceral natures in divinatory practices. Some have 
(p. 312) 
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suggested that the choice of this class of birds is associated with divination by entrails 
(extispicy) (Bouché-Leclercq, 1879–82: 129–30). That extispicy was not present in Homer, 
when birds of prey were already favoured, rules out a straightforward dependency. But it 
may still be the case that each of these practices reveals a related, deeper habit of 
divinatory thought, in which insight emerges from the most rudimentary features of 
organisms. The following are the most important birds, along with the gods, if any, with 
which they were traditionally associated: the eagle (Zeus), falcon (Apollo), hawk, raven, 
crow, owl (Athena), hen, heron, and vulture.
While figures such as Calchas and Tiresias are legendary for their acumen, the Greek 
technique of bird-reading never resided exclusively with any formal or informal social or 
political group. Anyone was authorized to read birds, and the ability to do so correctly 
correlated more closely with social standing than official position. This sets 
Greek bird-reading in contrast with both prior Near Eastern and later Roman parallel 
forms, in which the procedure is surrounded by a large bureaucracy. The significant 
elements are flight path and cries, and, in the poetic tradition especially, a whole range of 
more exotic happenings, often involving prey (a snake, another bird, even a fawn). The 
categories of right and left are the most prominent. They can on occasion be lined up with 
east and west (Iliad 12.239–40), which would mean a normative northward facing, but the 
evidence does not highlight this, suggesting instead that the most relevant data is not 
cardinal geography but their position with respect to the observer. Typically, some 
recently initiated or proposed course of action is thought to be endorsed or rejected by 
the appearance of a bird omen. Observers look for positive or negative readings along a 
binary scale, with natural behaviours and the right-hand side aligned with positive signs 
and unnatural or left-hand orientation taken as negative indicators. The hermeneutic 
system in bird reading never quite becomes reduced to consistent rules, a heterogeneity 
it has in common with nearly all other divinatory systems.
Among the Romans divination from birds is equally prominent. A summary of the auspices 
survives in the lexicon of Festus (s.v. Quinque genera signorum). He speaks of five kinds. 
Of the three most important, two varieties focus on birds: in addition to signs from 
thunder and lightning (ex caelo), Romans were particularly interested in avian flight 
patterns and cries (ex avibus), and in the feeding patterns of specially kept chickens (ex 
tripudiis). Of the remaining two types, auspices taken ex quadrupedibus were seen in the 
odd behaviours of mammals (on which more in a moment), and those ex diris (sc. signis) 
drew conclusions from odd coincidences and accidents of any kind. As was the case with 
Greek, the proper Latin term for the observation of birds, auspicium (from avis + specio), 
comes to mean observation of divine signs in general. Among the Romans, in contrast to 
the Greeks, a strong social institution, in the form of a collegium of augurs, grows up 
around the auspices to regulate and perpetuate the techniques, and deliver authoritative 
interpretations. The duty actually to perform the associated rituals fell to other 
magistrates. All matters of civic consequence required that the augurs be consulted (Livy, 
6.41), and holding the office was a mark of high social and political stature. Even Cicero, 
(p. 313) 
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whose views on divination were extensive, complex, and full of doubts, nevertheless 
venerated the office as a repository of social capital, and himself held it for a time 
(Cicero, De legibus 2.20–21). Birds whose song was significant were known as oscines and 
those whose flight was were called alites (Cicero, De divinatione 120).
It is useful to divide divination in a Roman context into two classes, one that officially and 
formally seeks out omens (impetrative), and a second that reads unsolicited omens 
(oblative) (Cicero, De legibus 2.21). The oblative category is familiar from the Greek 
materials, where the typical bird sign arrives spontaneously. The Romans’ impetrative 
versions are strikingly more developed than the Greeks’. In official state functions, when 
considering or commencing any course of action, auspices were taken to determine 
whether the gods favoured it. The person charged to carry out auspices ex avibus would 
mark out a sacred quadrant of the sky using a wand (lituus), then pitch a tent in a 
position to observe the heavens. The whole area was then made sacred by a 
ritual. The seat and the designated region of the sky were known as the templum. After 
the ceremony began any birds (or lightning) appearing in this screen were understood to 
be a divine omen. Every military camp established a templum for official use (Tacitus, 
Annals 2.13, 15.30) and the city of Rome itself maintained a permanent one on the top of 
the Capitoline Hill. The region of the sky was important enough that any building that 
occluded a part of it could be ordered to be torn down. (Cicero, De officiis 3.16) For 
auguries taken ex tripudiis, the Romans observed how a select group of chickens ate their 
grain. If they ate greedily, such that grain fell from their mouths, it was considered a 
positive sign; the reading was negative if they refused to come out of their cages, did not 
eat, made a cry, beat their wings, or flew away (Livy, 10.40; Cicero, De divinatione 2.72–
3). The sound and force of the grain hitting the ground was of particular interest. The 
ceremonial chickens were kept in cages for the purpose, and were tended by a special 
expert in such matters known as a pullarius.
The Romans understood divine signs as rendering judgment on the timing, not the 
content, of the action proposed. The ceremony could be repeated to achieve the desired 
message. Signs were valid for one day only, and the judgment they rendered could be 
supplanted by another ceremony on the next day. Roman auspices did not indicate the 
future, only divine approval or disapproval for the proposed course of action. The kinds of 
bird behaviour observed—especially impulsive, darting movements and sounds—are of a 
piece with a certain brittleness to the procedure, made all the more so under the weight 
of the heavy systematization that the Roman custom supported. The auspices required 
strict silence (silentium), and anything that broke it or otherwise disturbed the ceremony 
was called a defect (vitium) that could render the sign void. These aspects underscore a 
strong degree of impetuousness to the knowledge retrieved, opening up a further 
association, at a larger structural level, between divinatory knowledge and animal 
instinct.
Other Animal Behaviours
(p. 314) 
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There is further interest shown in a range of different animals and their behaviours, 
which are either signs themselves or are closely connected with divination. In examples 
of the latter, Apollodorus records a legend that the famous Greek seer Melampus gained 
his acute power to understand the significance of bird cries from having snakes lick his 
ears (1.9.11). Iamus is made capable of speaking prophetically when two snakes feed him 
with bee’s honey as an infant (Pindar, Olympians 6.46–54). Socrates reports a legend that 
swans sing louder just before their deaths as if prescient of their fates (Plato, Phaedo
84e–85b). Frogs and other creatures were noted to be aware of coming weather 
conditions (Cicero, De divinatione 1.15). Distinctions between such behaviours and 
divination are often murky (Cicero De divinatione 1.118, Iamblichus, De mysteriis 3.26; cf. 
Seneca, Naturales Quaestiones 2.32–51).
Among the Romans, strange births of all kinds could be divine signs. Over this class the 
professional haruspices (see below) had a particular expertise. Animals with deformities 
are important, particularly those with too many limbs or feet (Livy, 30.2.11, 
31.12.7, 32.1.11, 42.20.5). A prominence is given to those that cross species, especially 
humans with non-humans: as, for example, in the case of women giving birth to other 
species of animals (Julius Obsequens (Obseq.), 57, Pliny, Natural History 7.34, Appian, 
Bella Civilia 1.83), or to offspring that are mixtures of humans and animals (Livy, 27.11.5, 
31.12.7, 32.9.3), or animals born to a different species (Livy, 23.31, Aelian, Varia Historia
1.29, Josephus, Bellum Judaicum 6.5.3).
Coincidences and strange behaviours involving four-footed animals (ex quadrupedibus) 
made up another category of auspices for the augurs to consider. Suetonius relates that 
as Caesar’s death approached a herd of horses that he turned to the wild by the Rubicon 
in dedication to the river refused to graze and wept copiously (Life of Caesar 1.81). 
Cicero relates many comparable anecdotes in his De divinatione, as when, for example, a 
general and his horse accidentally fall (1.77), or mice are observed to have eaten through 
shields for battle (1.99), or a mule, a creature sterile by nature, gives birth (1.36; cf. 
Appian, Bella Civilia 1.83), or a monkey goes berserk and upsets a lot-drawing ceremony 
(1.76).
The Structure of Animal Parts as Signs
(p. 315) 
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Entrails
Observers in classical antiquity also saw divine signs in the movements, colour, size, 
shape, and texture of the internal organs of the animals they sacrificed to the gods. 
Divination from entrails is not disconnected from divination from birds. That birds of prey 
are favoured as sign-givers already highlights the connection with animal meat, and 
Greek tragedians make the link with extispicy. When in Sophocles’ Antigone Tiresias gets 
a negative signal from both his sacrifices and strange bird behaviours, he explains that 
the whole food chain has been polluted by the birds feasting on tainted carrion 
introduced into the food chain from the unburied corpse of Polynices (1005–13). 
Prometheus’s punishment stands as an iconic connection between the two practices. For 
refusing to give Zeus information, he is punished by having the archetypal bird of 
divination, Zeus’s eagle, repeatedly eat out his own liver, the central organ in extispicy 
(Aeschylus, Agamemnon 1021–5). That the entrails as a whole were also a part of human 
physiology is presumably not far from the surface of the consistent fascination with these 
organs. It may also help to explain the greater salience of divination from entrails in 
military contexts, where the human version of such organs would have been easily 
observable. Examples of the so-called ‘Humbaba face’ make the point graphically. These 
representations of human-looking faces fashioned out of animal intestines are found in 
multiple places in Mesopotamia, and in a temple on the acropolis at Gortyn on Crete, 
probably dating from the archaic period (Burkert, 1992: 49).
The liver receives the most attention of the organs (Aristophanes, Wasps 831, cf. 
Schol. ad loc; Cicero, De divinatione 2.28). Its health is taken as a sign that the god was 
present in it (Jastrow, 1907: 122–3). Anatomically, it was commonly thought to be the 
source of blood for the body, and so had a fundamental role in determining the vitality of 
the organism (Empedocles, DK31 B 150, 31 B 61.15; Hippocratic Letter, 23.7; cf. 
Aristotle, Parts of Animals 666a24–36; Jastrow, 1907: 121). The liver sits as a locus of the 
emotions, analogous to the position the heart takes in later European traditions. In the 
case of the liver, there is a particular prominence of the emotions of anger, grief, fear, and 
anxiety (Democritus, DK68 C 23.7; Archilochus, fr. 234; Aeschylus, Agamemnon 432, 792, 
Eumenides 135; Sophocles, Ajax 938; Euripides, Suppliant Women 599). And in the 
magical tradition, a target’s liver is subject to attack in the case of erotic spells (PGM IV.
117, 1530; VII 992; PDM xiv.657). Other organs of interest are the heart and lungs.
The Greeks borrowed the idea of the significance of entrails from the cultures of the 
ancient Near East, where it is in evidence in among the Assyrians, Hittites, and 
Mesopotamians. The practice is very old. A clay representation of a divinatory liver that 
survives from Mesopotamia dates from the eighteen century BC, and reveals a discipline 
already developed enough by then to produce a relatively elaborate and inscribed 
practical model. Comparable model livers show up around the Near East and also in the 
Classical period near Rome. The bronze liver of Piacenza dates from the late second 
century BC. About the size of a fist and elaborately inscribed, its affinities with the 
Mesopotamian models that predate it by a millennium indicate a clear line of influence 
(p. 316) 
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from the Near Eastern to the Italian practices. The ways in which the Piacenza liver is 
stylized depart from actual anatomy in ways that parallel the Mesopotamian versions 
(Burkert, 2005: 48).
Homer speaks of divination from animal parts, but only in a circumscribed way. He refers 
to a certain kind of sacrificing priest (thuoskoos), who is apparently interested in gauging 
whether the burned sacrifices have been accepted by the gods or not (Iliad 24.221, 
Odysssey 21.145; 22.318, 321). The distinction between this practice and the more 
elaborate examination of aspects of the entrails themselves is preserved in the 
Prometheus text with which we began, where divination from the thigh-bones wrapped in 
fat is treated as a separate category from divination from the smoothness, colour, or 
symmetry of the organs. We have evidence of both kinds in the Classical period. The 
testimony of Sophocles’ Antigone mentioned above shows the main question to be 
whether the sacrifice is accepted by the divinity, indicating divine favour or disfavour. On 
the other hand, Plato assumes a rich set of hermeneutical possibilities built into the liver 
in his discussion of the organ in the Timaeus (71c). A section in Euripides’ Electra also 
indicates the fuller range: Aegisthus disembowels a calf, takes the entrails in his hands, 
and on inspection sees that the liver is lacking a lobe, portending trouble, and the portal 
vein and gall bladder reveal oncoming threats (826–9). There are some twenty 
representations of liver inspection on Attic vases from 530 to 490 BC, indicating a well-
developed interest, which probably accrued some complexity and detail. In historical 
accounts, we find mainly simpler descriptions, without the anatomical specifics, of an 
omen from sacrifice being favourable or unfavourable (Herodotus, Histories 6.76, 6.112, 
9.45, 9.61–2; Xenophon, Anabasis 1.8.15, 2.2.3).
The technical vocabulary that Greeks and Romans use for labelling the 
significant portions of the liver is shared with the ancient Near East. In each tradition 
observers could see a ‘gate’, ‘path’, ‘river’, and a ‘head’ or ‘lobe’. Even some of the 
particular interpretive moves show a measure of overlap that cannot be coincidental. A 
missing ‘lobe’ or ‘head’ is taken to mean disaster for the king, and multiple such lobes 
mean a rivalry for power (Burkert, 2005: 50). Overall the language points to increments 
along a binary logic of auspicious and inauspicious. A normal, healthy-looking liver was a 
good sign. Bad signs are seen in plugged up pathways, non-standard colour, and 
especially deformities—the more dramatic the more significant. Beyond this basic 
architecture, the Romans leave behind more evidence of a system than the Greeks. Both 
Cicero and Livy speak of a pars hostilis and a pars familiaris (Cicero, De divinatione 2.28; 
Livy, 8.9.1). This adds a further layer of interpretive possibilities, with the pars hostilis
being a negative twin of the other, and allowing for another doubling of significant 
criteria.
The Piacenza liver confirms this and gives fascinating further information. It is an 
Etruscan product, inscribed elaborately with Etruscan names of gods. In its shape, it has 
a clear left/right split indicated by a cleft, and exaggerated protuberances standing for 
the gall bladder, portal vein, and caudate lobe. The inscriptions are nearly all on the 
visceral side. A band of markings around the perimeter divides it into sixteen sections, 
(p. 317) 
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each inscribed with the name of a god (or sometimes two). Several sources indicate that 
the Etruscans divided the heavens into sixteen regions, with each of them being the 
house of a different god (Cicero, De divinatione 2.42, Servius ad Aeneid 8.427; Martianus 
Capella, 1.45). We do not have evidence of such an understanding of the heavens outside 
the Etruscan world. This indicates that observers would correlate conditions in the 
microcosmic areas of the liver with macrocosmic regions of the skies and the gods that 
lived there. Divination by entrails becomes intertwined with observation of the skies—
whether lightning, or birds, or of the heavens more generally. The model, then, 
functioned as a portable instrument. Given the degree of stylization, it would be more 
likely to be the tool of an expert than a non-expert. Within the perimeter are twenty-four 
interior quadrants, with further names inscribed. The interpretive possibilities with forty 
total regions overlaid by overall binary aspects are exponentially large. In this greater 
degree of elaboration, the Roman system is more like Near Eastern precedents than the 
Greek evidence shows.
As was the case with divination from birds, the Romans regulated and maintained the 
reading of entrails within a social institution. Roman extispicy was overseen by a 
haruspex, and the augurs appear to have had nothing to do with it. The institution of the 
haruspices had a less strict and systematized character than that of the augurs. Not quite 
an office, and not formed into a college until the late republic, the haruspex was most 
often an independent expert drawn from the local Etruscan population (Beard, North, and 
Price, 1998, vol. 1: 20). According to legend the technique was handed down from one 
Tages, an Etruscan dwarf who emerged from a farmer’s furrow in Roman mythic times. 
Haruspices could render an official opinion on the meaning of entrails only upon being 
asked by a body of magistrates. They provided responses that were then accepted or not 
(Cicero, De legibus 2. 21, De haruspicum responsis). Their expertise also covered 
prodigies and lightning. It is noteworthy that the Romans both abundantly consulted 
entrails and also consistently ascribed the practice to the Etruscans. In a cultural trope 
that is historically common, reminiscent of the stylized views of Native Americans among 
culturally dominant groups in North America, the Romans saw in a conquered local 
people a distinctive and exotic religious expertise. In a telling hyperbole, Livy tells us that 
the Etruscans were the ‘nation more than any other devoted to religious rites’ (5.1.6). 
This social position of exoticism simultaneously provides a distinctive power and raises a 
potential hostility among interested clients. The rage that Gracchus expresses upon 
receiving an unwelcome judgment, insulting the haruspices as foreigners, cannot have 
been idiosyncratic to him (Cicero, De natura deorum 2. 11). While governmental 
mechanisms existed to consult the haruspices, they maintained a certain distance from 
the state apparatus (Yébenes, 1991: 186). Private haruspices were under the employ of 
generals and magistrates (Sallust, Bellum Iugurthium 63.1; Plutarch, Marius 8.8; Cicero, 
De divinatione 1.72; Plutarch, Sulla 9.6; Cicero, In Verrem 2.3.28). It is the haruspex
Spurinna who, upon observing a sacrificial beast missing a heart, and then on the next 
day seeing a liver missing its head, warns Julius Caesar to beware the Ides of March 
(p. 318) 
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(Cicero, De divinatione 1.119; Suetonius, Life of Caesar 12.81; Plutarch, Caesar 63.3; 
Valerius Maximus, 8.11.2).
Two ideas competed to explain the emergence of divine signs in the entrails. Some 
thought the god intervenes at the moment of the sacrifice and places a stamp on the 
innards (Cicero, De divinatione 1.118; Pliny, Natural History 28.11). Others found this 
idea unappealing since it made the divine out to be a kind of busybody, with time enough 
to do menial work. A second idea suggests that the divine is involved by guiding the 
selection of which animal is sacrificed (Cicero, De divinatione 1.118, cf. Seneca, Naturales 
Quaestiones 2.32.4). We also have testimony that divination from entrails was connected 
with an additional important method. It formed a preliminary ritual before the delivery or 
oracles at Delphi (Plutarch, De defectu 435c, 437b).
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Divine Insight and Animal Ways of Knowing
Just as animals are a prominent theme in the study of divinatory practice, so too in 
ancient divinatory theory. There are three main currents of philosophical thought on 
divination, and, counterintuitively, when thinkers draw the connecting line of 
communication between the gods and us, they consistently construct the path via the 
realm of animals. The first two schools of thought, coming from Plato and Aristotle, 
understand divinatory insights to be tied with animal instinct, and to belong to a fringe 
form of cognition that is specifically connected with humans’ animal natures. The Stoics, 
by contrast, embrace divination as an important piece of their understanding of the 
cosmos as a whole, and of humans as part of it. To explain divine signs they centrally 
appeal to the principle that the cosmos is itself a living animal (zōon). The idea 
pre-exists in Plato’s Timaeus, but they develop it much further, proposing that because 
the cosmos is a single creature, it must course through and through with 
interconnections by which otherwise hidden conditions can be observed. The theories 
vary from thinker to thinker, but in each case they have to do not with abstractions or the 
disembodied realms philosophers customarily linked with the divine. Rather they are 
anchored in the creaturely side of the human and the corporeal dimensions of the world.
According to Plato, there is a portion of the human soul that is identical with the soul of 
animals, and it is specifically to this part that divinatory insight belongs. While he 
regularly references divination as a literary motif—making it an emblem of non-discursive 
knowledge and referencing it in a variety of tones, sometimes mocking (Euthyphro 3e, 
Meno 92c), sometimes neutral (Laws 634e, 694c; Symposium 192d), sometimes with a 
rather profound sincerity (Republic 523a, 505e; Philebus 64a)—divination as a topic in its 
own right interests him in the Timaeus (69b–72d). This dialogue is distinctive in the 
corpus for being anchored on the concept of the animal (zōon). To a unique degree here, 
he understands the anthrōpos as an animal (90e) or a creature (thremma; 30d1) among 
the others. He entertains broad discussions of such matters as anatomy, reproduction, 
digestion, and metabolism, and treats our corporeal, creaturely natures as a 
consequential piece of what it is to be human. Plato speaks of the creation of the universe 
itself as a cosmic living animal (zōon empsuchon; 30b8) and narrates that a race of 
human animals was fabricated in its image (27c–41d). Further, he claims that non-human 
animals are then directly derived from humans. The original race of men was given a 
three-part soul, with a highest divine part, reason, housed in the head. It rules over the 
lower parts, including the lowest one, which is placed below the midriff in the lower 
trunk. It has a sinister, animalistic cast; the creators had to ‘bind this one down there like 
a wild beast’ where it is ‘constantly grazing at its manger’ (70e). In addition to these 
pungent metaphors, he explicitly equates this part of the human soul with the souls of 
animals. Humans are the original race of creatures. Through reincarnation, the first race 
of men bequeath their souls to following generations. Those among them who did not 
keep the highest parts of their souls robust, were reborn as creatures equipped only with 
(p. 319) 
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the lower orders of soul and these became the non-human animals (90e–92c). This 
zoogony puts a finer point on the animalistic side of the human soul: more than just being 
animal-like, it is actually not distinguishable from the soul of an animal.
Now, all three parts of the soul, even the lowest, engage in distinctive cognitive activities. 
These are related to their internal movements. The rational intellect operates like our 
internal gyroscope, spinning in alignment with the motion of the fixed stars, and the 
soul’s lowest, animal part mostly lurches about and produces only appetitive desires (44b, 
90d). But occasionally during sleep, when most of the soul is dormant, the animal part 
can become soothed and begin to spin in alignment (71d). When it does it is able to 
achieve its own kind of insight, divination through dreams, which he calls a phantom 
image of daytime intellectual activity. Plato further deepens the animalistic and corporeal 
character of this cognition and, in a bold move, links it directly to divination by the liver 
(71a–e). He tells us that the gods created the organ of the liver as a safeguard that 
soothes the lower soul when its animalistic desires get out of hand. The liver 
mirrors images from our upper soul that either calm or frighten the lower soul into 
submission. Plato elaborates that this is why this organ in recently slain animals contains 
the signs it does, though he plays down their usefulness. The gods granted this capacity 
to the very lowest part of our soul as a compensation to it, he says. They ‘rectified the vile 
part in us by establishing divination there, so that it might in some degree lay hold of the 
truth’.
Aristotle thinks that people can achieve insights in their dreams that are unavailable to 
their higher intellects and, using his own distinctive intellectual resources, he also maps 
these cognitive capabilities onto the parts of our souls, those that we share with animals. 
The most important treatise on the topic, his On Divination by Dreams, claims that only 
people who have atrophied higher intellects are able to achieve such insights. He speaks 
of vibrations from faraway events that move through the air at night, when it tends to be 
still, and are then assembled into a prescient dream image by the soul. To account for 
that assembly, he rules out appeals to the highest, discursive, self-aware part of the soul, 
for that is precisely what is dormant during sleep. And it is especially dormant among 
those who have very little of it to begin with. Simpletons, the melancholic, the talkative, 
and those out of their wits are better able to see what comes next in their nocturnal 
visions because they are most easily pulled along the vector towards which the external 
vibrations are proceeding. In this way they get a vision that correlates to the way events 
in the outside world are tending. He connects this kind of cognition directly with animal 
instinct.
It is counterintuitive for Aristotle that empty-headed people should have insights to which 
those with robust intellects are blind, and he tries to explain how lower-level cognitive 
operations achieve some intellectual gain. In the Eudemian Ethics he links accurate 
dreamers with another strange group, which he also observes strictly among dim-witted 
people: those with consistent good luck (Eudemian Ethics 8.1247a–1248b). Both these 
groups benefit from a rudimentary form of cognition that we share with animals (and in 
fact all things with souls). Consistently across his corpus, Aristotle divides the soul’s 
(p. 320) 
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functions into three main layers: all living things have the nutritive capacity, which 
regulates the powers to grow and reproduce; a smaller group, the subset of animals, are 
in addition capable of perception; and within this group a further subset (humans) have 
an even higher capacity on top of that and are capable of reason. Our reasoning is by far 
the most advantageous information-processing centre, but the lower orders produce 
incremental good outcomes as well. He links both the psychic assembling of prescient 
dreams and the spontaneous actions that result in good luck to the most rudimentary of 
the psychic functions. He claims they emerge from a class of psychic movements beneath 
our awareness that characterize the nutritive soul. They go under the technical term of 
hormai, or impulses. The hormai are unselfconscious inclinations to do things, below the 
level of thought and even of conscious desire. They are involuntary activities, such as 
those that result in digestion and gestation, which produce obviously good things 
happening for each creature. They manifest a core Aristotelian principle that Nature 
always, or for the most part, reaches for the better (On Generation and Corruption, 
336b27–28). He invokes the principle specifically in consideration of lowly creatures: ‘But 
perhaps even in inferior creatures there is some natural good stronger than 
themselves which aims at their proper good’ (Nicomachean Ethics, 1173a4–5). Both the 
lucky and those who get warnings in their dreams are operating according to these 
impulses, and achieve their good outcomes via this lowly information-processing centre. 
Just as it steers even rudimentary forms of life towards what is good for them, so it is 
humming away inside humans as well. The empty-headed are especially attuned to it, 
because their internal dialogue, which in intellectually sound people is busy working 
towards more complex good things, is so faint. While they cannot achieve the magnificent 
insights of which fully realized humans are uniquely capable, they can achieve uncanny 
good results via their attunement to the incremental benefits achieved by the 
rudimentary systems. Aristotle thereby aligns divinatory insight with animal instinct.
For both Plato and Aristotle, divination is a fringe phenomenon, and is explicable as an 
alternative form of cognition, which shows affiliations with how animals think. In the case 
of the Stoics, the basic premises are quite different. Divination is a core piece of their 
basic theological positions, is embedded in their principles of physics and cosmology, and 
is affiliated not with a lower form of cognition, but is an expression of what they 
understood to be the one, single form of it. Their distinctive views on theology, cosmology, 
and physics, and their monistic psychology, yield a cosmos with quite a different shape 
from that of either Plato or Aristotle. Given the degree of this difference, it is all the more 
noteworthy that the category of the animal again emerges as a central one. They 
straightforwardly claim that the signs percolating through the cosmos, including those 
that emerge in dreams or oracles, operate based on the physiological structures of a 
living organism, in their case the relevant animal is the cosmos itself.
The Platonic idea that the cosmos is a single creature takes on an entirely new pertinence 
for the Stoics. For them it is not a metaphor, but a statement of fact; and their larger 
philosophical system has unique resources for thinking it through (Long and Sedley, 
1987: 47C, 54A, B, F). In Stoic understanding, all things that exist in the universe are 
material. They are a composite of two kinds of matter: the inert kind, or hulē, and an 
(p. 321) 
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active divine vapour, evanescent but still material, called pneuma. This is the case for 
every discrete entity in the cosmos, from planets, to people, to grains of sand. The hulē
gives a thing bulk and the rarified fiery internal pneuma provides it with its qualities, 
characteristics, and energy. Different degrees of pneuma result in different orders of 
these characteristics (Long and Sedley, 1987: 47P, Q, 53A). Inanimate things are held 
together by a degree of pneuma called hexis (‘tension’); plants and non-mobile living 
things like a fetus are held together by physis; animals are held together by soul, or 
psychē, which they understand to be the particular form of pneuma that provides for 
perception and self-propulsion; and rational self-propelled living things, that is humans, 
have a logikē psychē. Further, the pneuma that permeates each individual thing is entirely 
contiguous with the pneuma in each adjacent thing, including the pneuma that courses 
through the atmosphere around us and beyond into the fiery regions of the heavens. So, 
the pneuma as a whole is a synthesizing breath that suffuses every nook and cranny of the 
cosmos and links each part of it to every other part in a non-mysterious, entirely 
materialist mode. They claim the pneuma as a whole is coextensive with the 
divine, and finally that it is the soul of the cosmos, which they understand to be a single 
animal.
The flow of energy that vivifies the cosmic creature, via the pneuma, they label with the 
technical name sympatheia. Sympathy, literally ‘co-feeling’ in Greek, is a centrepiece of 
their explanations for divinatory signs (Cicero, De divinatione 2.34) and it is anchored in a 
notion of the cosmos as an organism. The term pre-exists in the Hippocratic medical 
tradition and in physiology (On Nutriment 23; Aristotle, Parts of Animals 653b, 690b). It 
articulates the interconnection of body parts that, while distant from each other, may well 
be interconnected. A flush in the face might be linked with a fever produced by an 
infection in the toe. The concept sets the operation of divinatory signs within a powerfully 
physiological context. That unseen conditions in the cosmos will be made manifest by 
visible parts of it is for them as sure as the idea that organisms manifest signs of their 
conditions in visible symptoms. Such divine signs are an integral part of their physics and 
theology. The Stoics tie the very existence of the divine to the existence of divine signs, an 
argument all the more powerful since atheism is a near absurdity in antiquity (Cicero, De 
divinatione 1.82–3).
The significance of categories related to animals, even in this abstract arena, further 
underscores the broad relevance of such themes to divination in general. Each of these 
thinkers, in their different ways, configures the study of divination as an investigation 
into a more or less distinctive way of knowing—they attempt to discern how certain 
people are able to know things in ways that stretch our customary cognitive abilities. To 
do this they begin with an understanding of divination as an emergent insight, which 
bubbles up from knowledge directly embedded in organisms. The salience of animal 
themes suggests a larger habit of thought around animal nature, beyond merely the kinds 
of signs observers look to—whether birds, beasts, or entrails. More than placing humans 
in conversation with their gods, the practices of divination place humans in conversation 
(p. 322) 
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with the creaturely dimensions of their experience. Within the Classical context, human 
intellects and corporeal bodies—animals and humans alike—sit in sometimes strident 
opposition. Via divination they find a medium in which they can collaborate.
Suggested Reading
The best source for ancient ideas and practices of divination is to be found in Cicero’s De 
divinatione, which passes on important Stoic and Peripatetic ideas, and aims to aggregate 
many earlier schools of thought. Animals figure commonly in his considerations. Multiple 
commentaries illuminate the text. In English, those of Arthur Stanley Pease (1969) and 
David Wardle (2006) are the best guides. Auguste Bouché-Leclercq’s (1879–82) four-
volume overview of the Historie de la divination dans l’antiquité has not been surpassed 
for its thorough documentary coverage of the topic. There is a welcome contemporary 
revival of interest as shown in the articles of Derek Collins (2002, 2008) and in Sarah Ilse 
Johnston’s Ancient Greek Divination (2008).
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